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If the States are united under one government, there will be but
one national civil list to support; ifthey are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different national civil
lists to be provided for-and each of them, as to the principal
departments, coextensive with that which would be necessary
for a government of the whole. The entire separation of the
States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too
extravagant and too replete with danger to have many advocates.
-Alexander Hamilton, The FederalistNo. 13

The principle issue in Alexander Hamilton's
Federalist No. 13 was economy in government:
Hamilton argued that one central federal government was superior to separate state governments
in order to preserve the economies of governmental administration.2 Hamilton advocated a system
of "dual federalism," in which certain enumerated
powers would be given to the federal government
3
while other powers would remain with the states.
Enough of his contemporaries clearly agreed with
Hamiltonion concepts of federalism to incorpo4
rate them into the United States Constitution.
I The Federalist No. 13 (Alexander Hamilton).
2

See id.

3

See id.

See id.
See, e.g., Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. 2260,
106th Cong. (1999) ("A bill [t]o amend the Controlled Substances Act to promote pain management and palliative care
without permitting assisted suicide"). This bill is a timely,
well-publicized example of federal preemption because, if
enacted, it will override Oregon's Death With Dignity Act. See
generally Michael Grunwald, House Votes to Prohibit Doctors' Aid
for Suicide; Bill Aims to Invalidate Law Passed in Oregon, WASH.
4

5

POST, Oct. 28, 1999, at Al.
6 See, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S.
355, 360 (1986).
The Act establishes, among other things, a system of
dual state and federal regulation over telephone service,
and it is the nature of that division of authority that
these cases are about. In broad terms, the Act grants to
the FCC the authority to regulate 'interstate and foreign
commerce in wire and radio communication,' while expressly denying that agency jurisdiction with respect to

...intrastate communication service.

.

.' However, while

More than two hundred years later, federalist
principles continue to define our government.
Federalism is more relevant to the nature of our
country today than ever before, as we enjoy far
greater mobility and interstate bonds than our
Founding Fathers could possibly have foreseen.
Today, federalism reveals itself when the federal
government preempts or allocates state power on
a wide array of issues. 5 Federalist tenets are particularly evident in the law governing telecommunications services, as the dual interstate/intrastate
nature of telecommunications services clearly re6
flects a "federalist" regulatory regime.
Consistent with these principles, Congress enacted legislation affecting the telecommunications market with an eye toward creating a "federalist" telecommunications infrastructure that
provides for the rapid national deployment of
new services. 7 In doing so, Congress implicitly recognized that the introduction of telecommunicathe Act would seem to divide the world of domestic tele-

phone service neatly into two hemispheres-one comprised of interstate service, over which the FCC would
have plenary authority, and the other made up of intrastate service, over which the States would retain exclusive
jurisdiction-in practice, the realities of technology and
economics belie such a clean parceling of responsibility.
This is so because virtually all telephone plant that is
used to provide intrastate service is also used to provide
interstate service, and is thus conceivably within the jurisdiction of both state and federal authorities. Moreover, because the same carriers provide both interstate
and intrastate service, actions taken by federal and state
regulators within their respective domains necessarily affect the general financial health of those carriers, and
hence their ability to provide service, in the other 'hemisphere.'
Id. (citations omitted).
7 See, e.g., Preamble to the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 71 (an act "[t]o promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower
prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of
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tions services could be significantly delayed if it
required the approval of both the federal government and all fifty states." In Hamilton's words,
seeking such approvals would be "a project too extravagant and too replete with danger to have
many advocates."-'
In 1993, Congress enacted legislation that severely restricted state regulation of rates and entry
for certain qualified mobile telephone services,
thereby "federalizing" much of the regulation of
wireless telecommunications services. 10 Section
6002 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 ("Budget Act") amended section 332 of
the Communications Act of 1934 ("Communications Act" or "the Act") I' to provide a revised regulatory scheme for mobile wireless services. Importantly, revised section 332 granted the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC" or the
"Commission") authority to preempt state regulation of entry into the wireless market and state
regulation of rates charged by wireless service
providers, while preserving to the states the power
to regulate the "other terms and conditions" of

cial response to such claims. It will analyze relevant court decisions and examine the strengths
and weaknesses of various rationales. This comment concludes that the FCC has with notable exceptions interpreted section 332 in accordance
with the language of the statute and congressional
intent, while the courts have added little to defining the scope of section 332 because of their reluctance to thoroughly probe the provision's limits. Finally, this comment predicts that future
litigation will compel the courts to more fully assess section 332's preemptive reach to provide litigants with practical boundaries for bringing suit.
I.

THE LANGUAGE AND POLICIES OF
SECTION 332

Section 332(c)(3)(A), the preemption provision of section 332, reads,
Notwithstanding sections 152(b) and 221(b), no State
or local government shall have any authority to regulate
the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial
mobile service or any private mobile service, except that
this paragraph shall not prohibit a State from regulating the other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services. 13

wireless service. 12

This comment will analyze the preemption provision of section 332 and the legislative considerations that went into its enactment. Further, it will
examine how the FCC has interpreted the preemption provisions of section 332 through its implementing orders and other proceedings. This
comment will also explore the various ways in
which telecommunications carriers have attempted to invoke the preemption provision of
section 332 to avoid state regulation and the judinew telecommunications technologies"). See also H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 104-458, at 1, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10
(stating that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was
designed "to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory na-

tional policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and
information technology and services to all Americans and by
opening all telecommunications markets to competition
. ...").
8 See In re Petition of New York State Public Service Commission to Extend Rate Regulation, Report and Order, 10 FCC
Rcd. 8187 n.64 (1995) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at
480-81 (1993)). It states,
[b]ecause commercial mobile services require a Federal
license and the Federal Government is attempting to
promote competition for such services, and because
providers of such services do not exercise market power
vis-Ai-vis telephone exchange service carriers and State
regulation can be a barrier to the development of competition in this market, uniform national policy is necessary and in the public interest.
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Enactment of revised section 332 was guided by
two overriding principles-a belief that like serv4
ices should be regulated in the same manner
and a recognition that regulation of mobile services is most appropriate in a federal forum because mobile services "by their nature, operate
without regard to state lines as an integral part of
the national telecommunications infrastructure." 15 To ensure federal jurisdiction over comId.
9 The Federalist No. 13 (Alexander Hamilton).
10 Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).
11 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-530 (1994 & Supp.
III 1997).
12
See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (1994) (stating that "no
State or local government shall have any authority to regulate
the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile
service or any private mobile service, except that this paragraph shall not prohibit a State from regulating the other
terms and conditions of commercial mobile services").
13
14

Id.

See 139 CONG. REc. H6134 (1993) (statement of Rep.
Fields). Congressman Fields stated, in support of the Communications Licensing and Spectrum Allocation Improvement Provisions of the Budget Reconciliation Act, that "this
title outlines the regulatory treatment for new commercial
mobile radio services, such as PCS, in order to ensure that
like services will be regulated similarly." Id.
15
H.R. REp. No. 103-111 (1993), rprinted in 1993
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mercial mobile radio rate and entry regulation,
section 332 clearly preempts states in that area. 16
Although section 332 creates a presumption of
federal jurisdiction over rates and entry, Congress
established criteria in section 332(c)(3)(B) by
which states could petition the FCC for authority
to continue regulating rates for commercial mobile services. 7 However, Congress tasked the FCC
with ensuring that any state's exercise of authority
does not undermine the statutory goal of providing similar services similar regulatory treatment.
In amending section 332 of the Act, Congress
intended "to establish a Federal regulatory framework to govern the offering of all mobile services." 8 Congress revised section 332 because it
found that the regulatory structure governing mobile services subjected "common carrier" services
to state as well as federal rules while permitting
"private" mobile services to escape regulation.
Congress revised section 332 to ensure that it did
not "impede the continued growth and development of commercial mobile services and deny
consumers the protections they need[.]" 19 Congress recognized that the implementation of the
original section 332 had created an unbalanced
marketplace in which certain private mobile radio
licensees, but not their cellular competitors, were

exempt from the obligations of Title II of the
20
Communications Act and from state regulation.
Also, the imbalance forced commercially operated mobile licensees to compete against private
carriers that faced essentially no regulation at the
21
Federal or state level.
With the passage of revised section 332, Congress clearly sought to achieve "regulatory parity"
22
among services that were "substantially similar."
Congress noted that "[flunctionally, these 'private' carriers have become indistinguishable from
common carriers but private land mobile carriers
and common carriers are subject to inconsistent
regulatory schemes." 23 Furthermore, Congress
noted that "the disparities in the current regulatory scheme could impede the continued growth
of development of commercial mobile services
and deny consumers the protections they need if
new services such as PCS were classified as pri-

U.S.C.C.A.N. 378.
16 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (1994); see also U.S.
CONST. art VI., cl.2. The Supremacy Clause of Article VI
mandates that federal law may supersede state laws and preempt state authority when Congress exercises a granted
power. See id.
17
See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (3) (B). By August 8, 1994, eight
states had filed petitions to retain their authority to regulate
intrastate CMRS rates. See, e.g., In re Petition of Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, State of Haw., for Authority to Extend Its Rate Reg.
of Commercial Mobile Radio Servs. in the State of Haw., Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 2359, 2359, para. 2 (1995). All of these petitions were denied. See, e.g., In re Petition on Behalf of the La.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n for Authority To Retain Existing Jurisdiction over Commercial Mobile Radio Servs. Offered Within
the State of La., Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7898 (1995);
In re Petition of the People of the State of Cal. and the Pub.
Utils. Comm'n of the State of Cal. to Retain Reg. Authority
over Intrastate Cellular Serv. Rates, Order on Reconsideration,
11 FCC Rcd. 796 (1995); In re Petition of N.Y. State Pub. Serv.
Comm'n To Extend Rate Reg., Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd.
8187 (1995); see also In re Petition of Ariz. Corp. Comm'n,
Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd.
7824 (1995); In re Petition on Behalf of the State of Haw.
Pub. Util. Comm'n, for Authority to Extend its Rate Reg. of
Commercial Mobile Radio Servs. in the State of Haw., Report
and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7872 (1995); In re Petition of the
State of Ohio for Authority to Continue to Regulate Commercial Mobile Radio Servs., Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd.
3379 (1995).

H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 1095 (1993).
H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 549 (1993).
20
See id. (contrasting common carrier regulation, including Title II requirements "that rates must be just and reasonable and not unreasonable discriminatory" and state regulation of rates and services, with private carriers, who "are
statutorily exempt from [TIitle II of the Communications Act
and from [state] rate and entry regulation").
21
See id.
22
H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 548.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 549.
25
In order for a carrier to meet the statutory definition
of a CMRS, the carrier's services must be (1) offered for
profit, (2) interconnected to the public telephone switched
network, and (3) "effectively available" to a "substantial portion of the public." 47 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
26
Private mobile services are any that are not commercial mobile services or the "functional equivalent" of a commercial mobile service. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(d)(3) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998).
27
See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The
Act requires common carriers to provide service upon reasonable request, and prohibits them from charging unjust or
unreasonable rates or from engaging in unjustly discriminatory practices. See 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1994). The Act imposes a
number of other requirements upon common carriers. For
example, carriers are required to file schedules of their rates
and charges (i.e., tariffs). See 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1994). Carriers

vate." 2 4 To achieve its goal of regulatory equality,

Congress ordered the classification of wireless
providers into one of two categories: Commercial
Mobile Radio Service ("CMRS") 2 5 or Private Mobile Radio Service ("PMRS") .26 CMRS providers
were to be considered common carriers and
would therefore be subject to Title II of the Communications Act. 27 As common carriers, CMRS
18

19
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carriers were made subject to petitions to deny
28
and statutory public notice requirements.
Although other common carriers are subject to
state regulation of rates and entry into the market, section 332(c)(3)(A) provided that states
were preempted from regulating CMRS rates and
entry to foster the growth and development of
CMRS services on a nationwide level.2 9 Congress
intended to completely preempt the states in
terms of regulating the rates and entry of CMRS
services unless states could demonstrate to the
FCC's satisfaction that they fulfilled the qualifica30
tions Congress set forth in section 332 (c) (3) (B);
meeting these standards allowed the state to continue regulating rates and entry."'

A.
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The FCC's Implementing Orders32

On October 8, 1993, the FCC released a Notice
of ProposedRulemaking ("NPRM") to implement the
regulatory parity requirements of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.33 The NPRM
was structured to address five basic issues. First, it
sought public comment on the criteria for drawing the boundaries between private and commercial mobile radio services. 34 Second, it addressed
the regulatory classification of existing services to
attempt to apply the criteria to current licensees
and the services

they provided.3

5

Third,

the

NPRM sought comment on the regulatory classification of Personal Communications Services
("PCS")3 6 and proposed a system allowing PCS

licensees to "self-designate" their regulatory status
II.

THE FCC'S IMPLEMENTATION OF
SECTION 332.

are required to file with the FCC their contracts and agreements with other carriers. See 47 U.S.C. § 211 (1994). There
are restrictions upon the ability of individuals to serve as officers or directors of more than one carrier, and FCC approval for such interlocking directorates is required. See 47
U.S.C. § 213 (1994). Carriers must seek FCC approval before
commencing or discontinuing service. See 47 U.S.C. § 214
(1994). The Budget Act gave the FCC authority to forbear
from enforcing certain provision of Title II, and the FCC did
adopt forbearance rules so that CMRS providers are not required to (1) file tariffs for interstate service to their customers, or for interstate access service; (2) file copies of intercarrier contracts; (3). seek authority for interlocking directors;
or (4) submit section 214 applications for new facilities or
discontinuance of existing facilities. 47 C.F.R. § 20.15(b)
(1998).
28
See 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Under
section 309(d) of the Communications Act, common carrier
applications must be placed on public notice for 30 days
prior to grant, to allow for petitions to deny to be filed. See id.
29
See generally H.R. REP. No. 103-111 at 501-02 (1993).
30 See 47 U.S.C. 332(c) (3) (B) (1994).
'I
32

See id.

The FCC released notices of proposed rulemaking
and orders regarding the implementation of section 332
that, unlike those referenced herein, are not explored in detail in this comment because they do not bear on the issues
presented in this comment. See, e.g., In re Implementation of
Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Second FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 9 FCC Rcd. 4400 (1994); Fourth Report and
Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7123 (1994); Third FurtherNotice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 6880 (1995); and Memorandum
Opinion and Order on PartialReconsideration of Second Report and
Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 19729 (1996).
33 See In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of
the Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile
Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 FCC Rcd. 7988
(1993) [hereinafter, Mobile Services NPRM].
34
See Mobile Services NPRM, 8 FCC Rcd. at 7989, para. 7.
The Mobile Services NPRM states,
As revised by the Budget Act, section 332 of the Commu-

nications Act, governs the regulation of all "mobile services" as defined in section 3(n) of the Act. The statute
divides all mobile services into two categories, "commercial mobile service" and "private mobile service," both of
which are defined in section 332(d), and confers power
on the Commission to further specify these terms by regulation. We request comment on how these terms
should be interpreted and, where appropriate, further
specified in our regulations.
Id.
5 See Mobile Services NPRM, 8 FCC Rcd. at 7994, para. 34.
It states,
The Budget Act requires us to examine the regulatory
status of all existing mobile services under the statutory
definitions discussed above. We therefore seek comment
on which existing mobile services will become commercial mobile services and which will become private mobile services under section 332(d). In particular, we seek
comment on the degree to which the new definitions require existing private services to be reclassified as commercial mobile services and on whether existing common carriers may be reclassified as private.
Id.
36
PCS is defined in the Commission's rules as "[r]adio
communications that encompass mobile and ancillary fixed
communication that provide services to individuals and businesses and can be integrated with a variety of competing networks." 47 C.F.R. § 24.5 (1998). There are two types of PCS
service: narrowband and broadband. See id. Narrowband PCS
service is expected to be used to provide services as voice
message paging, two-way acknowledgement paging, and
other text-based ser-vices. See Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau, Narrowband PCS Fact Sheet (visited Jan. 3, 2000)
<www.fcc.gov/wtb/pcs/nbfctsh.html>. The narrowband PCS
spectrum is located in the 901-902, 930-931, and 940-941
MHz bands. See 47 C.F.R. § 24.129. Broadband PCS will likely
be used in the development of advanced wireless phones,
and to provide a variety of mobile services including multifunction portable phones, portable facsimile and other imaging devices, new types of multi-function cordless phones, and
advanced devices with two-way data capabilities. See Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau, Broadband PCS Fact Sheet
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as either private, commercial or both. Fourth, it
questioned the application of Title II to CMRS
services and examined the extent to which the
Commission should forbear from imposing common carrier obligations on CMRS providers. 38 Finally, the NPRM addressed other issues associated
with interconnection rights, foreign ownership
limitations and state petitions to extend rate regu39
lation authority.
The FCC's FirstReport and Order40 in the section
332 proceeding was released January 4, 1994, only
three months after the First NPRM. It addressed
only one issue-foreign ownership-and did not
discuss the larger issues of the proceeding, such as
interpreting the statutory definitions of CMRS
and PMRS or defining the scope of federal preemption under section 332.41 Although CMRS

services are subject to foreign ownership restrictions pursuant to section 310(b) of the Act, 42 the

First Report and Order established procedures
whereby PMRS services that had been reclassified
to CMRS could request a waiver and retain existing foreign ownership. 43 The PMRS-to-CMRS
(visited Jan. 3, 2000) <www.fcc.gov/wtb/pcs/bbfctsh.html>.
Broadband PCS spectrum is located in the 1850-1910 and
1930-1990 MHz bands. See 47 C.F.R. § 24.200 (1998).
37
See Mobile Services NPRM, 8 FCC Rcd. at 7997, para. 44.
The Mobile Services NPRM reads,
We therefore seek comment on how the new regulatory
framework under section 332 should affect the regulatory classification of PCS. Specifically, we request comment on whether PCS should be uniformly treated as a
commercial mobile service, as defined by section 332, or
whether there are also potential applications of PCS that
would constitute private mobile service under the statutory definition. We urge commenters to address these
issues with specific reference to both narrowband and
broadband PCS.
Id.
38
See Mobile Services NPRM, 8 FCC Rcd. at 7999, para. 54.

It states,
We tentatively conclude that this section authorizes us to
establish classes or categories of commercial mobile services and to promulgate regulations that vary among such
classes. In addition, we tentatively conclude that this section authorizes us to establish regulatory requirements
that differ for individual service providers within a class.
We invite comment on these tentative conclusions.
Id. The Budget Act gave the FCC wider authority to regulate
the mobile services industry, but it and the FCC's implementing orders also established a basis for the Commission to forbear from regulation when less government action might engender more competition. See, e.g., In re Implementation of
Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Second Report and Order,9 FCC Rcd. 1411 (1994); In re Further Forbearance from Title II Reg. for Certain Types of Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 9
FCC Rcd. 2164 (1994). So while revised section 332 provided
that commercial mobile services were to be regulated as com-

licensees "grandfathered" by this waiver procedure would be permitted to retain their existing
foreign interests, 4 4 but any subsequent transfers
or assignments would have to be made to domes45
tic persons or entities.

The Second Report and Order began implementing the substantive requirements of section 332 by
interpreting the statutory definitions of the terms
"CMRS" and "PMRS." 46 Specifically, the Commission determined that Congress intended the
CMRS classification to apply to all mobile services
that operate for profit and provide interconnected service to the public or a substantial portion of the public. 4 7 In applying this definition to
existing mobile services, the Commission found
that all common carrier mobile licensees fell
within the CMRS classification. Also encompassed
by the classification were certain private radio
licensees in the Specialized Mobile Radio
("SMR"), Business Radio, 220-222 MHz and private paging services, regulated under Part 90 of
48
the Commission's Rules.

mon carriers, the Commission is authorized to exempt or forbear from applying any of the provisions of Title II of the Act
to commercial mobile radio carriers, except for sections 201,
202, and 208. See id. at 2164, para. 1. Section 201 requires
common carriers to provide service upon reasonable request
and upon reasonable terms, and to interconnect with other
carriers upon order of the Commission. 47 U.S.C. § 201
(1994). Section 202 forbids unjust or unreasonable discrimination. 47 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). Section 208 provides for the
filing of complaints to enforce these and any other Title 11
obligations of a common carrier. 47 U.S.C. § 208 (1994). To
exempt CMRS providers from a Title II requirement, the
FCC must determine that it is not necessary to enforce the
requirements of Sections 201 and 202 of the Act or to protect
consumers and the public interest. See In re Further Forbearance from Title II Reg. for Certain Types of Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 9
FCC Rcd. 2164, para. 4 (1994).
39
See Mobile Services NPRM, 8 FCC Rcd. at 8001, para. 70.
40
In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, First Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 1056 (1994) [hereinafter Mobile Services First Report and Order].
41
See id.
47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1994).
42
43
See Mobile Services First Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. at
1056, para. 1.
44
See id. at 1057, para. 9.
45 See id. at 1058, para. 10.
46
See In re Implementation of Section 3(n) and 332 of
the Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile
Services, GN Dkt. No. 93-252, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC
Rcd. 1411 (1994), Erratum, 9 FCC Rcd. 2156 (1994) [hereinafter Second Report and Order].
47 See id. at 1427, para. 43.
See id. at 1448-58, paras. 82-109.
48

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

Following the Second Report and Order,49 the
Commission adopted a Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking ('FurtherNPRM") on April 20, 1994, to
address pending issues relating to the implementation of section 332. 5 11 Specifically, the Commission sought to address the impact of the amended
statute on the technical, operational and licensing
rules for all mobile services, 5' and particularly the
rules affecting those Part 90 services that were reclassified as CMRS by the Second Report and Or52

der.

(i)

The number of [CMRS] providers in the state,
the types of services offered by commercial mobile radio service providers in the state, and the
period of time that these providers have offered
service in the state.

(ii)

The number of customers of each [CMRS] provider in the state; trends in each provider's customer base during the most recent annual period if annual data is unavailable; and annual
revenues and rates of return for each [CMRS]
provider.

(iii)

Rate information for each [CMRS] provider, including trends in each provider's rates during
the most recent annual period or other data
covering another reasonable period if annual
data is unavailable.

(iv)

An assessment of the extent to which services offered by the [CMRS] providers the state proposes to regulate are substitutable for services
offered by other carriers in the State.

(v)

Opportunities for new providers to enter into
the provision of competing services, and an
analysis of any barriers to such entry.
Specific allegations of fact regarding anti-competitive or discriminatory practices or behavior
by [CMRS] providers in the State.

In the Further NPRM, the Commission pro-

posed to amend its rules to ensure that competing
CMRS services would be governed by comparable
regulatory requirements and to eliminate inconsistencies in the regulation of CMRS services. 53
On May 19, 1994, the Commission revised the Further NPRM on its own motion to seek comment on
the additional issue of whether to limit the
amount of spectrum CMRS licensees may aggre54
gate in a given geographic area.
Following the Second Report and Order, the FCC
also issued a Public Notice dated July 8, 1994, setting forth the criteria for states to meet to extend
or initiate CMRS rate regulation pursuant to section 332(c)(3)(B). 55 The FCC required states to
establish the following facts to attain jurisdiction
over rates and entry:
(i)

market conditions with respect to such [CMRS]
services fail to protect subscribers adequately
from unjust and unreasonable rates or rates that
are unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; or

(ii)

such market conditions exist and such [CMRS]
service is a replacement for land line telephone
exchange service for a substantial portion of the
telephone land line exchange service within such
56
state.

The Commission also listed examples of the
types of evidence that would be considered in determining market conditions and the need for
consumer protection:
49
The Commission released a partial Order on Reconsideration on December 20, 1996, denying petitions for reconsideration filed by Cellular Service, Inc., ComTech, Inc., and
National Wireless Resellers Association, but addressing the
right of cellular resellers to interconnect with facilities-based
cellular carriers. See In re Implementation of Sections 3(n)
and 332 of the Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment

of Mobile Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Partial
Reconsideration of Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 19729

(1996).
50
See In re Implementation of Section 3(n) and 332 of
the Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile

Services, Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 9 FCC Rcd.
2863 (1994) [hereinafter Mobile Services FurtherNPRM].
51
See id. at 2864, para. 2.
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(vi)

(vii)

(viii)

Evidence, information, and analysis demonstrating with particularity instances of systematic unjust and unreasonable rates, or rates that are unjust or unreasonably discriminatory, imposed
upon [CMRS] service subscribers.
Information regarding customer satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with services offered by [CMRS]
service providers, including statistics and other
information about complaints
filed with the
57
state regulatory commission.

The Third Report and Order58 addressed the issues raised in the FurtherNPRM. In this order, the
Commission took four steps to implement both
the broad goals of the Budget Act and the more
narrowly focused requirements generated by its

See id.
See Budget Act § 6002(d) (3), Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107
Stat. 312.
52

53

54

See Mobile Services Further NPRM, 9

FCC Rcd. at

2881-85, paras. 86-105.
55
See FCC Announces Procedures Governing State Petitions for Authority to Regulate Commercial Mobile Radio
Service Rates, Public Notice,10 FCC Rcd. 737 (1994).
56
Id. at 737.
57 Id.
58
In re Implementation of Section 3(n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, GN Dkt. No. 93-252, Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd.
7988 (1994) [hereinafter Mobile Services Third Report and Order].
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August 9, 1994, statutory transition deadline. 59
First, the Commission determined which reclassified services would be considered "substantially
similar" to existing common carrier services in order to implement the Budget Act requirement
that such services be subject to "comparable" regulation. 60 The Commission concluded that services should be considered substantially similar if
they compete or have the reasonable potential,
broadly defined, to compete in meeting the needs
and demands of consumers. 6'
Second, the Commission revised Part 22 and
Part 90 technical and operational rules to ensure
that the services licensed under those parts were
governed by rules that were indeed "comparable." 62 One such revision was the adoption of

wide-area licensing for 800 MHz and 900 MHz
services to make them more like their cellular and
PCS counterparts.

63

Third, to effectuate the broad congressional
goal of ensuring that competition shapes the development of the CMRS market, the Commission
adopted rules that capped at 45 MHz the total
amount of combined broadband PCS, cellular
and SMR spectrum in which an entity may have
an attributable interest in any given geographic
area. 64 The Commission "adopt[ed] this cap as a

minimally intrusive means of ensuring that the
mobile communications marketplace remains
competitive and retains incentives for efficiency
and innovation," and made the cap applicable
only to PCS, SMR and cellular licensees meeting
65
the definition of CMRS.
Fourth, to carry out the Budget Act's licensing
requirements, the Commission adopted uniform
rules for the licensing of CMRS services, including
reclassified services. 66 It also concluded that competitive bidding procedures should be used to select from among mutually exclusive applications
and modified its licensing rules for Part 22 and
59
60

61

See id. at 7995, para. 6.
See id. at 7996, para. 10.

See id. at 7996, para. 12.
See id. at 8036, para. 80.
63 See id. at 8050, para. 113.
64
See Mobile Services Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. at
8100, para. 238; see also 47 C.F.R. § 20.6(a) (1998).
65
See Mobile Services Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. at
8100, para. 238. But see In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review,
Spectrum Aggregation Limits for Wireless Telecommunications Carriers, WT Dkt. No. 98-205, Report and Order, FCC 99244, para. 66 (Sept. 22, 1999) (Commission raised the cap to
55 MHz in Rural Service Areas).
62

Part 90 CMRS services to adopt filing windows for
competing initial applications.6 7 Moreover, it tentatively concluded in the Further NPRM and
adopted a single, uniform application form for
use by all CMRS and PMRS applicants in all land
mobile services.

B.

68

Other Section 332 Decisions by the
Commission

In addition to the NPRMs and orders directly
implementing section 332, the Commission has issued decisions in other proceedings that also define the scope and reach of section 332.69 For example, the Commission addressed the reach of
section 332 in its decisions denying state petitions
to regulate CMRS services pursuant to section
332(c) (3) (B). The FCC's universal service orders
7
have also added to the defining of section 332. 0
1. Denials of Regulatoiy Authority for States
As previously discussed, the FCC has denied
every state petition requesting authority to continue regulating CMRS rates. 7 1 Section 332 requires the FCC to examine state petitions to determine if the states sustained their statutory
burden of demonstrating that "market conditions
with respect to [commercial mobile radio] services fail to protect subscribers adequately from unjust and unreasonable rates or rates that are unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory. '

72

In

denying the state applications, the FCC concluded that
a state must do more than merely show that market
conditions for cellular service have been less than fully

competitive in the past. In order to retain regulatory
authority, a state must show that, given the rapidly
evolving market structure in which mobile services are
provided, the conduct and performance of CMRS prov-

iders ill-serve consumer interests by producing rates
66
See Mobile Services Third Report and Orde, 9 FCC Rcd. at
8144, para. 354; see also 9 FCC Rcd. at 8148, para. 363; 8151,
para. 370; 8153, para. 377; 8155, para. 383; 8157, para. 386;
and 8160-61, paras. 393-94.
68

See id. at 8135, para. 328.
See id. at 8120, para. 293.

69

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

70

See, e.g., In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal

67

Service, CC Dkt. 96-45, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776
.(1997).
71
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
72
47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (3) (A) (i).
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that are not just
and reasonable, or are unreasonably
73
discriminatory.

Based upon this standard, which many states consider a heightened standard, the FCC denied all
74
of the state applications.
Connecticut was the only state to appeal the
FCC's denial.7 5 In Connecticut Department of Public
Utility Control v. FCC,76 the Connecticut PUC acknowledged the FCC's grant of authority to determine whether CMRS subscribers were adequately
protected from unjust and unreasonable rates,
but alleged that the FCC was bound to follow the
explicit factors enunciated in the Second Report and
Order.77 In effect, the PUC claimed that because
the list of factors did not specifically include the
"present-day impact of future market entry" in
evaluating current market conditions, the FCC
was precluded from considering this as a factor in
denying Connecticut the ability to continue to
78
regulate intrastate CMRS rates.
In upholding the FCC's actions, the Connecticut
PUC court focused on the fact that the Budget Act
amendments to the 1934 Communications Act
"dramatically revise [d] the regulation of the wireless telecommunications industry. . .,,7 The court
noted the importance of the federal regulatory
scheme and the necessity of preventing conflicting state regulations from impeding the development of this federal regulatory scheme. 80
The court concluded that although the factor
had not been listed by the Commission in the Second Report and Order, it was "entirely appropriate
for the Commission to take into account the present-day impact of future market entry in evaluat7In re Petition on Behalf of the Louisiana Public Service
Commission for Authority To Retain Existing Jurisdiction
over Commercial Mobile Radio Services Offered Within the
State of Louisiana, Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7898, 7899,
para. 6 (1995); see also In re Petition of New York State Public
Service Commission to Extend Rate Regulation, Report and
Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 8187, 8189-90, para. 16 (1995).
74 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
75 See Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Util. Control v. FCC, 78
F.3d 842 (2d Cir. 1996).
76
77

78
71
80

See id.
See id. at 848.
See id.

Id. at 845.

See id. at 850.
Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Util. Control v. FCC, 78
F.3d 842, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1996).
82 See id. at 851.
83 Congress defined "universal service" in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as follows:
Universal service is an evolving level of telecommunica81
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ing whether current market conditions are inadequate to protect consumers." 8 ' The court said the
Commission did not improperly impose a heightened standard of proof on states by concluding
that states had to clear "substantial hurdles" if
they sought to continue or initiate cellular telephone regulation in circumvention of federal preemption.82

2.

Universal Service Orders

The FCC's implementation of the federal universal service program is another proceeding in
which the scope of section 332 has been further
defined."" Section 254(f) of the Act provides,
A State may adopt regulations not inconsistent with the
Commission's rules to preserve and advance universal
service. Every telecommunications carrier that provides
intrastate telecommunications services shall contribute,
on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, in a manner determined by the State to the preservation and advancement of universal service in that State. A State
may adopt regulations to provide for additional definitions and standards to preserve and advance universal
service within that State only to the extent that such
regulations adopt additional specific, predictable, and
sufficient mechanisms to support such definitions or
standards that do not rely on or 84
burden Federal universal service support mechanisms.

The FCC's Universal Service Order8 5 was the first

opportunity the Commission had to address any
perceived conflict between sections 254(f) and
332(c) (3) (A). In the Universal Service Order, the
FCC evaluated the interplay between the provisions to address concerns raised by commentors
in the universal service proceeding who argued
tions services that the Commission shall establish periodically tinder this section, taking into account advances in
telecommunications and information technologies and
services. The Joint Board in recommending, and the
Commission in establishing, the definition of the services that are supported by Federal universal service support mechanisms shall consider the extent to which such
telecommunications services-(A) are essential to education, public health, or public safety; (B) have, through
the operation of market choices by customers, been subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers; (C) are being deployed in public telecommunications networks by telecommunications carriers; and (D)
are consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
necessity.

47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(1) (1994 & Stipp. IV 1998).
84 47 U.S.C. § 254(f) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
811 In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service,
Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776 (1997) [hereinafter Universal Service Order].
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that the provisions were inconsistent. The FCC
concluded that the two statutes were not in conflict and then concluded that section 332(c)(3)
and its prohibition on rate regulation of wireless
service providers did not prohibit a state from assessing wireless service providers a surcharge to
support universal service under section 254(f).86
In so holding, the FCC stated it "agree [d] with the
Joint Board's recommendation that all telecommunications carriers that provide interstate telecommunications services must contribute to the
support mechanism . . .,,87Further, the Commission stated that "[w]ith respect to the issue of
whether states may require CMRS providers to
contribute to state universal service support mechanism, we agree with the Joint Board and find
that section 332(c) (3) does not preclude states
from requiring CMRS providers to contribute to
state support mechanisms." 88 This became the
foundation for subsequent decisions holding that
requirements for contribution to state universal
service funds did not constitute rate regulation.
3. Pittencrieff Communications
The FCC again addressed the interaction between sections 254(f) and 332(c) (3) (A) in the Pittencrieff Communications decision."s - In this proceeding, the Commission denied Pittencrieff
Communications's petition for a declaratory ruling. 90 Pittencrieff requested in its petition that the
FCC use its section 332 authority to preempt certain sections of the Texas law, 9' which required
CMRS providers operating in Texas to contribute
to the state universal service fund. 92 The FCC determined that nothing in section 332 precluded
states from requiring CMRS providers to contribute on an "equitable and nondiscriminatory basis"
to state universal service mechanisms. 93

87

See id. at 9181, para. 791.
Id. at 9173, para. 777.

88

Id. at 9181, para. 791.

86

See In re Petition of Pittencrieff Comm., Inc. for Declaratory Ruling Regarding Preemption of the Tex. Pub. Util.
Regulatory Act of 1995, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13
FCC Rcd. 1735 (1997) [hereinafter Pittencrieff Order].
90 See id.
9' See id. at 1754, para. 37.
92
See id. at 1738, para. 7.
93 See id. at 1737, para. 4.
94
12 FCC Rcd. 8776 (1997).
95
See Pittencrieff Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 1741, para. 13.
See id. at 1746, para. 22.
96
89

The Commission relied on the Universal Service
Order-"4 for its conclusion in the Pittencrieff Order
that section 332(c)(3) did not preempt Texas
from requiring CMRS providers to make intrastate-based universal service contributions. 95 The
Commission held that Texas's requirement of
contributions into the universal service fund was
not "rate regulation" proscribed by the Communications Act, even though rates were influenced.' 6
Specifically, the Commission found that such state
regulation fell within the "other terms and condi97
tions" language of section 332 (c) (3) (A).
The Commission's most recent guidance concerning the scope of section 332 came in a Memorandum Opinion and Order ruling on a Petition for
DeclaratoryRuling filed by Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. ("Southwestern Bell"). 98 In its
petition, Southwestern Bell asked the Commission
to make six declarations. 9 9 First, Southwestern
Bell requested that the FCC declare that Congress
and the FCC have instituted a general preference
that competitive rather than regulatory forces
should govern the CMRS markets.' 0 0 The Commission granted this aspect of Southwestern Bell's
petition.'0° The Commission also granted Southwestern Bell's next request by declaring that it is
accepted CMRS industry practice to charge in
whole-minute units and that it is not unjust or unreasonable under 47 U.S.C. 201 (b) to charge for
incoming calls.' 0 2 Southwestern Bell also requested that the Commission declare that "the
term 'call initiation' in the CMRS industry refers
to a cellular customer activating his or her phone
both to place an outgoing call and to accept an
incoming call."' 0 3 The Commission declined to
grant this portion of Southwestern Bell's petition,
finding that the determination of whether call initiation includes charges for incoming calls should
be based on the specific facts and circumstances
See id.
In re Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 99-356 (rel. Nov. 24, 1999)
[hereinafter Southwester Bell Order].
97
98

99' See id. at 2, para. 3.
l00 See id.
101 See id. at 5, para. 9 (stating, "We agree that, as a mat-

ter of Congressional and Commission policy, there is a 'general preference that the CMRS industry be governed by the
competitive forces of the marketplace, rather than by governmental regulation,' and we grant Southwestern's petition in
this respect").
102
103

See id. at 2, paras. 3, 14.
Id. at 2, para. 3.
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4
of each case.11

A.

Southwestern Bell's fourth request was for the
FCC to find that "the definition of the term 'rates
charged' in Section 332(c) (3) of the Communications Act . . . includes at least the element of a

CMRS provider's choice of which services to
charge for and how much to charge for these services." 10 5 The Commission granted this request.' 0
The Commission considered Southwestern
Bell's fifth and sixth declaratory requests together. Southwestern Bell's requested a declaratory ruling that federal law-namely 47 U.S.C.
§332(c) (3)-exclusively governs "challenges to
the 'rates charged' to end users by a CMRS provider, including charges for incoming calls and
charges in whole-minute increments."' 0

7

It also

requested the converse: that section 332(c)(3)
bars direct or indirect challenges to CMRS provider's "rates charged."' 0 8 Although the Commis-

sion found that section 332(c) (3) precludes states
from prohibiting CMRS carriers from charging
for incoming calls or charging in whole-minute
increments, the Commission further found that
state law claims stemming from state contract or
consumer fraud laws governing disclosure of rates
and rate practices are not generally preempted
under section 332.1')t

III.

HOW CARRIERS HAVE TRIED TO USE
SECTION 332.

Based upon the FCC's rules and decisions concerning the scope of section 332, carriers have
tried to use section 332 in many different ways: to
defend against state claims in lawsuits, to trump
zoning laws, to attempt to free themselves from
universal service obligations, and to achieve other
business objectives.
104
See Southwester Bell Order, supra note 98, at para. 17
(stating, "We decline to issue this requested ruling. The

Commission has no special technical or policy expertise to

illuminate the question of what constitutes 'call initiation' for
either the outgoing or incoming calls of wireless carriers.")
105
Id. at 2, para. 3.
106
See id. at 10, para. 20("... we find that the term 'rates
charged' in Section 332(c)(3)(A) may include both rate
levels and rate structures for CMRS and that the states are
precluded from regulating either of these").
1o7 Id. at 2, para. 3.
]08
1019

[Vol. 8

Section 332 as a Defense Against State-Law
Claims

The most common legal actions involving section 332 are those dealing with carriers' claims
that section 332 preempts customer complaints
brought under state law. Several courts have considered this section 332 defense under similar factual circumstances: customers brought suit in
state courts against carriers claiming unfair billing
practices and carriers removed the actions to federal district courts, claiming that section 332 preempted the claims because of their connections
to "rates." Almost all of the courts have reached
the same conclusion that the customers' state law
actions should stand.
Esquivel v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc." 0o
was the first case decided on such grounds. In Esquivel, customers of Southwestern Bell brought a
state court class action suit against the carrier concerning a liquidated damage provision in Southwestern Bell's service agreements."I The customers argued that the $200 liquidated-damage fee
was punitive and invalid under Texas common
law because it was not a reasonable estimate of the
actual damages that resulted from customer termination of service before the expiration of the
2
agreed term."1

Southwestern Bell cited section 332(c) (3) (A) to
argue for removal of the action to federal court.
The company claimed that the liquidated-damages provision of its service agreement was part of
its rates, thus creating federal question jurisdiction. By seeking removal, Southwestern Bell attempted to trigger section 332 to insulate itself
from Texas law." 3 When the motion to remove
was granted, the plaintiffs moved to remand back
to the state court."

4

from the language and purpose of Section 332(c) (3) of the
Act that states do not have authority to prohibit CMRS providers from charging for incoming calls or charging in whole
minute increments. This would 'regulate . . . the rates
charged by... [a] commercial mobile service . ..' We do not

agree, however, that state contract or consumer fraud laws
relating to the disclosure of rates and rate practices have generally been preempted with respect to CMRS.")
Ill 920 F. Supp. 713 (S.D. Texas 1996).
M See id. at 714.
112
See id.

See id.

11 3

See id.

See id. at 11, para. 23 (stating, "We find that it is clear

114

See id.
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The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas found that it was not clear whether
the case could be preempted by section 332.115
The court stated, "[Southwestern Bell] furnishes
no direct authority for the proposition that a case
filed in state court alleging rights only under state
law can be removed under the Communications
Act."' 16 The court found that even if preemption
did apply, it was not clear that Southwestern Bell
could invoke the "extraordinary doctrine of 'complete preemption.' "117 The ciourt reasoned that
Congress did not intend to completely preempt
state law, because it specifically declined to prohibit the states from regulating the "terms and
conditions" of CMRS service, including matters
such as customer billing information and practices, billing disputes "and other consumer protection matters."1 18 The court found further evidence leading it to decide against complete
preemption in the "savings clause" of the Communications Act." 9 The clause states, "Nothing in
this chapter contained shall in any way abridge or
alter the remedies now existing at common law or
by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in
Other courts have come to similar conclusions

in cases with fact patterns similar to Esquivel. DeCastro v. AWACS, Inc.,121 and Sanderson, Thompson,
Ratledge & Zimny v. AWACS, Inc.,122 were companion cases in the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey and the U.S. District Court for the
District of Delaware, respectively. The claim in
each case was the same: customers brought a class
action suit in state court against AWACS, alleging
failure to inform its customers that billing began
when a call was initiated, rather than once a connection was made. 123 In both cases, the plaintiffs
argued that AWACS commenced billing for a call
the moment a subscriber initiated a call by pushing the "send" button on the phone.124 After
pressing the "send" button, a period of time
elapsed during which the subscriber would not be
in communication with the party to whom the call
125
was made, but would be billed for the time.
The customers alleged that this billing practice
was contrary to "industry custom and practices."' 126 AWACS removed the action to federal
court under several theories, including that removal was proper under federal question jurisdiction because the Communications Act preempted the state-law class allegations.12 7 The customers then moved to remand back to state

See id. at 716.
Esquivel v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc.,

ner may be demonstrated by the explicit language of a statute, by an actual conflict between state and federal law, or "if

920 F. Supp. 713, 714 (S.D. Texas 1996).
117 Id. at 716. The doctrine of ordinary preemption
stems from the Supremacy Clause contained in Article VI of
the U.S. Constitution, which provides that federal law "shall

federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field 'as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it.' " Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator

addition to such remedies.'

115

116

12

0

be the supreme Law of the Land." Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl.2). Under the Supremacy Clause, state law that con-

Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Barnett Bank of
Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996). Ordi-

nary preemption is generally a federal defense to a plaintiff's

area that any civil complaint raising this select group of
claims is necessarily federal in character." Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987). When Congress

suit and under the well-pleaded complaint rule does not provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction. See Metropolitan
Life, 481 U.S. at 63 (1987). Under the doctrine of complete
preemption, a plaintiff's state law claim is not dismissed as
barred by federal law, but instead is converted into a federal
cause of action. See Caterpillar,482 U.S. at 386-87. Like the
doctrine of ordinary preemption, Congressional intent is the

completely preempts an area of state law, "any claim purport-

main focus of a complete preemption analysis. See Metropoli-

edly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from

tan Life, 481 U.S. at 66.

its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393
(1987). The situations in which the Supreme Court has
found complete preemption are limited; there are, in fact,

103-111, § 5205, at 260.

flicts with federal law is preempted. See id. Under the doctrine of complete preemption, the Supreme Court has indi-

cated that "Congress may so completely pre-empt a particular

118

119
120

only two settings in which the Court has concluded that Con-

121

gress intended to completely preempt: (1) suits to enforce a
collective bargaining agreement under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1994), and (2) suits for benefits under or to enforce rights
provided by a plan covered by the Employee Retirement In-

122

come Security Act ("ERISA"),

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B)

(1994), pursuant to section 502(a) (1) (B). Congressional intent in enacting federal law is the "ultimate touchstone" in an
ordinary preemption analysis. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at
516-17. Congress's intent to preempt state law in this man-

Esquivel, 920 F. Supp. at 716; see also H.R.

REP.

No.

See Esquivel, 920 F. Supp. at 716.
47 U.S.C. § 414 (1994).
935 F. Supp. 541 (D. N.J. 1996).
958 F. Supp. 947 (D. Del. 1997).

123
See Sanderson, 958 F. Supp. at 951-52; Decastro, 935 F.
Supp. at 545.
124

See Sanderson, 958 F. Supp. at 952; DeCastro, 935 F.

Supp. at 545.
125

See Sanderson, 958 F. Supp. at 952; DeCastro, 935 F.

Supp. at 545.
126

Sanderson, 958 F. Supp. at 951-52; DeCastro, 935 F.

Supp. at 545.
127

See Sanderson, 958 F. Supp. at 951; DeCastro, 935 F.
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court.

128

The courts granted the plaintiffs' motions to remand to state court, finding that the Communications Act did not require removal of the plaintiffs'
claims to federal court under the complete preemption doctrine.1 2" As in Esquivel, the courts
based their decision on the legislative history of
section 332(c)(3)(A), noting that while states
could not regulate rates or entry for CMRS services, they could still regulate the terms and condi-
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tions, Inc., doing business as CellularOne.' 37 Appellants claimed that CellularOne "engaged in
'deceptive, fraudulent, misleading and/or unfair
conduct' by not disclosing its practice of 'rounding' airtime in order to 'induce cellular customers
to use its cellular service, and/or in order to unfairly profit.' "138 Rounding was described as "a
common billing practice in the cellular and long
distance telephone industry where fractions of a
minute are rounded up to the next highest min39

tions of service. "i" Both courts also noted the importance of the Act's "savings clause."' 3' With

ute."1

distinctly federalist overtones, the court said that
section 332(c) (3) (A) "permits state regulation of
cellular telephone service providers in all areas
other than the providers' entry into the market
and the rates charged to their customers,"132 and
therefore, plaintiffs' claims concerning AWACS's
billing practices could be properly heard before a
state court." 3 Both courts asserted that AWACS's
arguments confused the distinction between complete preemption and ordinary preemption; only
complete preemption is "an appropriate basis for
34
federal question jurisdiction." 1
In Tenore v. AT&T Wireless Services,'13 5 the issue
was whether the trial court was correct in dismissing appellants' state law claims based upon
federal preemption under section 332(c)(3)(A),
among other theories.' 3" This case involved a
class action suit against respondents AT&T Wireless Services and McCaw Cellular Communica-

the 'Service Agreement' . . . which states that the

Supp. at 545.
128

129

See id.
See Sanderson, 958 F. Supp. at 951; DeCastro, 935 F.

Supp. at 555.
'3" See DeCastro, 935 F. Supp. at 552 (citing Esquivel, 920
F. Supp. 713).
'3' See Sanderson, 958 F. Supp. at 958. See also 47 U.S.C.
§ 414 ("Nothing in this chapter contained shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or
by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition
to such remedies.").
132
DeCastro,935 F. Supp. at 552.
133
134

15
136
1.7
138

See id. at 555.
Sanderson, 958 F. Supp. at 957.
962 P.2d 104 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
See id. at 105.
See id.
Id. at 106.

i.
Tenore, 962 P.2d at 106.
See id. at 107. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
promotes a proper relationship between the court system
and the administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S.
1

""(
141

Appellants claimed rounding was "contrary to
customer is billed only for 'the time you press
send until the time you press end.' "140 AT&T
moved for dismissal of the complaint based upon
federal preemption of state law claims under section 332(c) (3) (A) and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. '4'
The lower court found that as a matter of law
plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted by section 332(c)(3)(A) and dismissed plaintiff's
claims.1 42 In appealing the lower court's decision,
the appellants argued that the express language
of section 332 allows states to regulate "the other
terms and conditions of commercial mobile service" that do not relate to market entry or rate
regulation.'

3

They asserted that these "other

terms and conditions" included a carrier's "advertising, marketing and contracting, which are distinct from the federally regulated issues of rates
290 (1976). It applies to claims that are properly cognizable
in court but contain some issue within the administrative expertise of the agency. See Port of Boston Marine Terminal
Ass'n. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62
(1970). Thus, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, courts
will not decide a controversy involving a question within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal until after that tribunal has rendered its decision. See Killian v.J &J Installers,
Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158 (1991). Additionally, where the remedy
for some cause of action has been legislatively allocated to an
administrative agency, that agency has exclusive primary jurisdiction that precludes the parties from directly seeking adjudication in a court. See Claggett v. Department of Revenue,
464 N.W.2d 212 (1990). The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
requires a court to allow for a "referral" to the agency by staying further judicial proceedings to give the parties reasonable opportunity to seek an administrative ruling. See Reiter
v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258 (1993). Referral of the issue to the
administrative agency does not deprive the court of jurisdiction; it has discretion either to retain jurisdiction or, if the
parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, to dismiss the
case without prejudice. See id.
142
143

See id.
See id. at 111.
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and entry."' 144
The court concluded that the state law claims
brought by appellants and the damages they
sought did not implicate rate regulation prohibited by section 332 of the Communications Act
and therefore were not preempted.1 45 The court
found that the language of "terms and conditions" clause of section 332 limits the preemptive
reach of that provision, while the "savings clause"
is indicative of the intent of Congress to preserve
state law claims for billing or advertising that do
not attack market entry or rates charged by CMRS
providers.1 4 6 The court therefore reversed the
judgment of the lower court which dismissed Appellants' class action complaint based upon federal preemption of state law claims under section
147
332(c) (3) (A) and other theories.

users to call nationwide at a fixed monthly price.
It also eliminated roaming charges, which were
"applicable to the allotted number of minutes of
cellular telephone usage provided under each
plan." 152 Plaintiffs complained that these "onerate" plans were not made available to resellers at
wholesale rates, causing them to lose a number of

Digital Communications Network, Inc., v. AT&T
Wireless Services and AirTouch Cellular, Inc., 148 a

prices.515 5 Defendants argued that plaintiff's

more recent case interpreting section 332, is one
of the few cases where a court has found a claim
to be preempted by section 332.149 The plaintiffs
in this case were California corporations that resold cellular telephone service and cellular telephone equipment15 ° Defendants were the cellular license holders, who were authorized to
provide CMRS service using their own network on
licensed radio frequencies within the contractu1
ally limited geographic areas. 15
In March 1999, defendant AT&T began offering to customers in the Los Angeles area a "onerate" plan, which permitted cellular telephone
Id.
See Tenore, 962 P.2d at 117.
146
See id. at 112.
147
See Tenore, 962 P.2d at 117-18.
148
63 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
149
See Digital Communications Network, Inc. v. AT&T
Wireless Services and AirTouch Cellular, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d
at 1198.
150
See id. at 1195. As resellers, plaintiffs would purchase
telephone numbers, cellular telephone service and equipment from defendants for their own accounts and sell cellular telephone services and equipment to individual and corporate customers. See id.
151
See id.
152
Id. at 1195.
153
See Digital CommunicationsNetwork, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d
144
145

at 1196.

Specifically, plaintiffs alleged a cause of action pursuant to section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code, CA Bus. & Prof. § 17200, claiming unfair competition and intentional interference with economic advantage.
See id. Their federal claims were based on the argument that
AirTouch violated three sections of the Communications Act
and the FCC regulations implementing those portions of the
154

customers.15 3 Plaintiffs argued that defendants

were required to offer them discounted rates on
the one-rate plans pursuant to FCC and CPUC
laws and regulations.

1 54

Believing that the "one-rate" plans would be especially devastating to their businesses and customer base, plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal
court asserting that AT&T and AirTouch engaged
in unjust and unreasonable practices by failing to
offer them the one-rate plans at wholesale
causes of action were preempted under section
332. 1565 The court observed that there were strong
arguments on both sides of the question of
whether enforcement of reseller margins constitutes rate regulation preempted under section
332.157 On one hand, the court noted that section
332 provides that "no state ... shall have any authority to regulate . . . the rates charged by any
commercial mobile service."' 58 On the other

hand, the court recognized that the legislative history provides that states may impose a "requirement that carriers make capacity available on a
159
wholesale basis."

Act. See id. Plaintiffs argued that defendants violated section
201 (a) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 201(a), by refusing to offer
"resale versions of the 'one rate' programs offered to consumers," section 201(b) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b), by
engaging in unjust and unreasonable practices and section
202(a), 47 U.S.C. § 202(a), by unjustly and unreasonably discriminating against plaintiffs. See id. In May 1999, plaintiffs
discovered that defendant AirTouch also planned to offer a
"one rate plan" and wanted to know "whether these plans
would be offered at wholesale rates." See id. AirTouch said
that its "one rate" plans were not going to be offered to resellers under any terms. See id.
155
See id.
156
See Digital CommunicationsNetwork, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d
at 1196-97.
157
See id. at 1198.
158

Id.

Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 261). The
court found that "this point was elaborated on by the House
Subcommittee Chairman, Congressman Markey, who said,
'[t] he intent [of the Budget Act] is not to disturb the principle that carriers can be obligated to offer services to resellers
at wholesale prices.' " See id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at
261 (statement of Rep. Markey).
159
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The court deferred to the FCC's administrative
expertise:
The FCC has said that a state's review of contractual
agreements between two or more CMRS providers, in-

cluding interconnection

agreements

and roaming

agreements entered into by CMRS providers, also falls
within the 'other terms and conditions' language of section 332(c) (3) to the extent that such review does not
directly affect end-user rates. 160

Under this guidance from the FCC, the court
found "it could be argued that states may continue to regulate the rates charged by wholesale
CMRS providers to reseller CMRS providers, so
long as there is no 'direct' effect on the rates
charged to the ultimate consumer."' 6' But the

court found it also feasible to argue that the
FCC's directive encouraged "the maintenance of
the reseller margin (the discount off of its retail
rates that a facilities-based cellular provider must
give to resellers), since [maintaining the reseller
margin] does not directly regulate the rates that
either the facilities-based carrier or the reseller
charges the ultimate consumer." 162
However, because the express language of the
statute provides that states may not "regulate"
rates, the court found that plaintiffs claims were
preempted, 163 stating:
While the matter is not entirely free from doubt, in our
view this statutory language prohibits this Commission

from setting a particular numerical margin that must
be provided to cellular resellers. By requiring that a
particular numerical margin be maintained, we would
effectively be prescribing the maximum rate that a facilities-based cellular carrier could charge a reseller (without also changing its retail rate). We believe that such
action would amount to a regulation of the rates of the
facilities-based carrier, and therefore is preempted.' 6 4

B.

The Sixth Circuit's Approach to Section 332

Four federal Circuit Courts have opined on the
reach of section 332. The Sixth Circuit was the
first to reach the issue in GTE Mobilnet v. Johnson, 165 and it is the only circuit court to have ruled
on section 332 in regard to a billing dispute. 166 In
GTE Mobilnet, cellular telephone service providers
160

Digital CommunicationsNetwork, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d at

1198.
161

ld.

162

Id.

163

Id.

164

Id.

165

111 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 1997).

Compare Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. SCC of Kansas, 149
F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 1998), with Cellular Telecommunications Industry Ass'n v. FCC, 168 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1999),
166
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GTE Mobilnet and New Par sought section 332
protection after Cellnet, a cellular reseller, filed a
complaint with the Public Utilities Commission
("PUC") of Ohio alleging that the cellular carriers
engaged in discriminatory and anticompetitive
conduct by charging lower rates to affiliated entities that competed directly with Cellnet. 16 7 GTE
Mobilnet and New Par filed for an injunction in
federal district court to prevent the state commission from adjudicating the case, 168 arguing that
section 332(c)(3)(A) explicitly preempted the
state commission from hearing the case because
the relief sought would involve rate regulation by
the state commission.169

The district court ruled that section 332 preempted the PUC from considering Cellnet's complaint because Cellnet sought relief requiring the
state commission to regulate rates. The court
granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction that
prohibited the Ohio Commission from exercising
jurisdiction over the aspects of Cellnet's complaint alleging that the cellular carriers engaged
in discriminatory and anticompetitive conduct.
Additionally, the preliminary injunction enjoined
the PUC from exercising any control over the
rates charged by the cellular carriers. 17 The district court based its decision on its finding that
"the plain language of [section 332] reflected
Congress's clear intent to preempt the states from
controlling discriminatory rates."' 71
Claiming that section 332(c) (3) (A) did not
facially preempt state law, the Ohio Commission
appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction
to the Sixth Circuit, arguing that the district court
should have abstained from hearing the dispute
and allowed the state commission to determine
the preemption issue.' 72 The Sixth Circuit agreed,
holding that section 332(c) (3) (A) did not present
a facially conclusive instance of preemption.1 73 In
reaching this conclusion, the court questioned
whether congressional intent to preempt the regulation of discriminatory rates by state commis-

and Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393
(5th Cir. 1999).
167
See GTE Mobilnet, 111 F.3d at 472-73.
168
See id. at 473.
169
See id. at 474.
170
See id. at 472.
171
Id. at 474.
172
See id.
173
See GTE Mobilnet, 11] F.3d at 478.
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sions could be found in Congress's mandate to
the FCC to determine if "market conditions with
respect to such [CMRS] services fail to protect
subscribers adequately from unjust and unreasonable rates or rates that are unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory[.]'

74

The court rejected such

an interpretation, finding that the "broad-based
showing" imposed upon the states under subsection (i) to gain authority to regulate CMRS rates
did not compel the district court's conclusion that
states may no longer adjudicate individual cases
involving specific allegations of anti-competitive
1 75
or discriminatory misconduct under state law.
After rejecting the cellular carriers' claim of
"facially conclusive" preemption under section
332,176 the Sixth Circuit assessed whether the twoprong test it had articulated in prior cases required the Ohio Commission to abstain from adjudicating Cellnet's claims.1 77 This analysis first involved determining whether state and federal
courts possess concurrent jurisdiction to decide a
preemption issue and if so, determining whether
adjudication at the state level is preferable under
the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court
78
After determining the
in Younger v. Harris.1

existence of concurrent jurisdiction and the existence of ongoing state proceedings simultaneously
implicating important state interests and presenting adequate opportunities to raise constitutional
issues, the Sixth Circuit concluded the federal district court should have abstained from considering the cellular carriers' motion for relief and permitted the state commission to determine the
79
preemption issue.1

While federalist overtones can be found in the
Sixth Circuit's decision in the GTE Mobilnet case,
the court did not discuss a fundamental section
332 argument. It did not address whether the allegedly discriminatory rates constituted a consumer protection issue subject to state jurisdiction
pursuant to section 332's "other terms and conditions" language. 180 The consumer protection arId. at 479.
See id. at 479.
176
See id. at 480.
177
See id. at 475.
178
See id. at 480; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46
(1971). The Younger doctrine has three requirements: "(I)
there must be ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) those
proceedings must implicate important state interests; and (3)

gument was an approach heavily relied upon by
the federal district courts in Esquivel and its progeny, highlighting the dual regulatory scheme envisioned by Congress for wireless services.' 8 ' Rates
and entry into the market were specifically designated as federal issues, while all "other terms and
conditions" of service were to be left to the states.
This issue was raised in GTE Mobilnet, but the
Sixth Circuit based its findings upon precedent
and never reached the central issue of how Congress intended the dual regulatory scheme to apply to the governing of wireless services. The Sixth
Circuit's reliance upon other legal theories did little to define the scope of section 332 and left the
lower courts with no real guidance in terms of
how to apply section 332 when considering statelaw claims.
IV.

Perhaps the most debated way in which carriers
have tried to use section 332 is attempts to extricate themselves from state universal service obligations. As part of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Congress passed section 254, which allows
states to create and require contributions to universal service funds.

2

A state may "adopt regula-

to preserve and advance universal service." 8s 3 Act-

ing pursuant to section 254, several states adopted
statutes requiring all intrastate telecommunications providers, including the wireless providers,
to contribute to state universal service funds.
Perhaps the most well-known case decided on
this basis is Mountain Solutions, Inc. v. State Corp.
Commission of Kansas.1 8 4 In Mountain Solutions, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas considered the interplay between sections
332(c) (3) (A) and 254(f) in determining the propriety of requiring CMRS providers to contribute
to a state-sponsored universal service fund in Kan179

175

180

ings to raise consitutional challenges." Id.

8

tions not inconsistent with the Commission's rules

174

there must be an adequate opportunity in the state proceed-

THE RELATIONSHIP OF SECTION 332
TO UNIVERSAL SERVICE

181
182
183

See GTE Mobilnet, 111 F.3d at 482.
See generally id.

See supra part L
47 U.S.C. § 254(f) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
Id. ("Every telecommunications carrier that provides

intrastate telecommunications services shall contribute, on
an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, in a manner determined by the State to the preservation and advancement of

universal service in that State.").
184

966 F. Supp. 1043 (D. Kan. 1997).
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sas ("KUSF"). 18 5 The Kansas legislature had
adopted section 66-2008, which mandated the
Kansas Commission to require equitable nondiscriminatory KUSF contributions from "every telecommunications carrier, telecommunications
public utility and wireless telecommunications service provider that provides intrastate telecommunications services.''186 During the implementation of section 66-2008 at the Kansas Commission,
the wireless providers argued that section 332 preempted section 66-2008's wireless provider contribution requirement, but the Kansas Commission
rejected this argument in its order establishing
87
the KUSF. '
Upon the Commission's affirmation of its decision in an Order on Reconsideration, the wireless
providers filed suit in the federal district court
challenging the Commission's finding that it was
not preempted by federal law from requiring wireless provider contributions. 8 Broadly stated, the
question the wireless companies presented to the
court was whether section 332(c)(3)(A) exempted CMRS providers from the section 254(f)
provision allowing states to require intrastate telecommunications providers to contribute to state
89
universal service funds.
While the district court considered their request for permanent injunctive and declaratory
relief, the wireless providers sought a preliminary
injunction to prevent the Commission from requiring them to contribute to the fund or from
fining them for failure to contribute. 190 The district court denied the wireless providers' request
for a preliminary injunction."I9 Specifically, the
court rejected the petitioners' argument that section 332 prohibits states from requiring CMRS

186

See id. at 1045.
Id.

187

See id.

185

188 See id. at 1045.
189 See id.
190 See Mountain Solutions, Inc. v. State Corp. Comm'n
of Kansas, 966 F. Supp. 1043, 1046 (D. Kan. 1997).
191 See id. at 1049.
192 See id. at 1048-49.
193 149 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 1998).
194 See id. at 1059; see also Kan. Stat. Ann. § 66-2008(b)
(Supp. 1997).
195 The second sentence of section 332(c) (3) (A) reads,
Nothing in this subparagraph shall exempt providers of
commercial mobile services (where such services are a
substitute for land line telephone exchange service for a
substantial portion of the communications within such
State) from requirements imposed by a state commis-

providers to contribute to state universal service
funds, holding that the preemptive reach of sec92

tion 332 was limited.1

The wireless providers appealed to the Tenth
Circuit in Sprint Spectrum, LP v. SCC of Kansas,9 3
making that circuit the second to reach section
332 issues. In the Tenth Circuit appeal, the wireless providers again argued that section 332 pre194
empted section 66-2008 of the Kansas statute.
The wireless providers argued that the second
sentence of section 332(c) (3) (A) 19 5 applies spe-

cifically to "mobile services," 96 and that the parenthetical language in the second sentence set
forth the only condition under which a state
could require wireless providers to contribute to a
universal service fund: when there is a finding
that wireless service is a substitute for land line
197
service for a substantial portion of the state.
They argued that the regulatory limitations in the
second sentence were not overruled by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, including section
254(f), because the 1996 Act allowed only for express modification of earlier federal statutes. 19
The Kansas Commission replied by admitting
that it never found wireless service to be a substitute for land line service in Kansas. 199 The Kansas
Commission argued that no such finding was necessary because section 332(c) (3) (A) did not contradict the mandate of section 254(f) that "[e]very
telecommunications carrier" was required to contribute to the KUSF, without exception.20 0 In fact,
according to the Commission, the first sentence
of section 332(c) (3) (A)20 1 supported its reading
of section 254(f) by clarifying that, although states
may not regulate "entry" or "rates," the states may
"regulat[e] the other terms and conditions of
sion on all providers of telecommunications services necessary to ensure the universal availability of telecommunications service at affordable rates.
47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (3) (A).
196 See Sprint Spectrum, 966 F. Supp. at 1060.
197 See id.
1"98See id. at 1060-61.
199 See id. at 1061.
20(0
See id.
201
The first sentence of section 332(c) (3) (A) reads,
Notwithstanding sections 152(b) and 221(b) of this title,
no state or local government shall have any authority to
regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile service, except that his paragraph shall not prohibit a state from
regulating the other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services.
47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (3) (A).
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commercial mobile services." 20

2

The Kansas Com-

mission argued that "other terms and conditions"
included KUSF contribution requirements.2 0

3

In

defining the second sentence of section
332(c) (3) (A), the Kansas SCC read that sentence
to apply to the prohibition of rate and entry regulations only so far as a state wished to impose entry and rate regulations related to universal ser204
vice.
The court agreed with the FCC's finding that
section 332(c) (3) (A) did not preempt states from
requiring wireless providers to contribute to state
universal service funds and found it was not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statutes at issue.20 5 The court noted that because section 254(f) specifically granted states the
authority to require contributions for universal
service from all telecommunications carriers, and
in fact, mandated compliance by all carriers
("Every telecommunications carrier ...shall contribute . . ."), the state commission would appar-

ently be in violation of federal law if it established
a universal service fund but did not require contributions from wireless providers. 20 6 In addition,
read in its entirety, the second sentence of section

332(c) (3) (A) is limited in scope to that subparagraph and, thus, it did not limit and was not affected by section 254(f).The Tenth Circuit therefore found that the FCC's rulings at issue were not
"arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute" 20 7 and thereby gave the FCC's rules
20 8
controlling weight.
Unlike the Sixth Circuit's approach in GTE
Mobilnet, the Tenth Circuit's decision significantly
helped to define the boundaries of section 332.
While somewhat limited because of its relation
solely to universal service, the Tenth Circuit's
analysis did acknowledge Congress's attempts to
establish a dual regulatory system, and parsed out
202

Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. SCC of Kansas, 149 F.3d at

1061.
See id.
See id.
204
205
See id. at 1061-62.
See id.
206
Id. at 1061; see also Chevron v. National Resources De207
fense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (discussing the
appropriate test for court review of an administrative
agency's statutory interpretation).
208
See Sprint Spectrum, 149 F.3d at 1062. The court upheld the district court's ruling that the wireless providers did
not show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and
203

those powers belonging to the federal government from those saved for the states.
In addition to the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, the
D.C. and Fifth Circuits have also addressed section 332 issues. The D.C. Circuit case is another
universal service decision based on appeal of the
FCC's PittencrieffCommunications Order.20 9 Like the
Tenth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit also found sections
332(c) (3) (A) and 254(f) to be harmonious.
In Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association
v. FCC,210 the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, along with two CMRS providers, AirTouch Communications, Inc., and Sprint
Spectrum, L.P. (collectively "CTIA"), petitioned
for judicial review when the FCC denied Pittencrieff's petition for declaratory ruling, which
urged the Commission to rule that section
332(c)(3)(A) precluded states from imposing
wireless providers with state-based universal service obligations. 21 1 Specifically, Pittencrieff was
opposed to contributing to two state-run universal
service programs pursuant to the Texas Public
Utility Regulatory Act of 1995.212 After notice and

comment, the Commission denied the petition
for declaratory ruling on the ground that the
Texas's contribution requirements did not constitute rate or entry regulation of wireless services,
the sort of regulation section 332(c)(3)(A)
preempts. 2 1 3 The FCC allowed Texas to require

CMRS service providers doing business in Texas
to contribute annually to the state-run universal
service programs.2 1 4 In the Commission's view,
the Texas law fell within the "other terms and
conditions" language of the first sentence of section 332(c) (3) (A) and thus was within the state's
lawful authority. 2 15 The Commission also reasoned that to interpret section 332(c)(3)(A)
otherwise would contradict section 254(f), which
permits a state to require universal service contriwas in accord with the FCC's rules and found its decision was

not an abuse of discretion. See id.
209 See Pittencrieff 13 FCC Rcd. 1735 (1997).
210
211
212

168 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
See id. at 1334.
Texas Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1995, §§ 3.606,
(codified at TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 56.021-22,

3.608
57.043-46 (West 1998) [hereinafter "Texas Utility Act"]).
213 See CellularTelecomm. Indus. Assn, 168 F.3d at 1334; see
also In re Pittencrieff Communications, Inc., 13 FCC Rcd.
1735, 1737, para. 13 (1997) [hereinafter Pittencrieff Order].

214
215

See Pittencrieff Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 1741, para. 13.
See PittencrieffOrder, 13 FCC Rcd. at 1737, para. 16.
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butions from every telecommunications carrier
providing intrastate telecommunications services
in the state. 2 16 The denial of Pittencrieff's petition
was also consistent with the Commission's prior
Universal Service Order, which found that section
3 32(c)
(3) (A) did not preclude states from requiring CMRS providers to contribute to state universal service support mechanisms. 21 7
CTIA appealed the FCC's Pittencrieff decision.
As Sprint argued in the Tenth Circuit appeal,
CTIA argued that the second sentence of section
332(c)(3)(A)218-should be interpreted such that a
state may require contributions to a universal service fund only if wireless service is "a substitute for
land line telephone exchange service for a substantial portion of the communications within
'
such State."

2 19

The Commission responded by arguing that
CTIA's interpretation was plausible, but not "cogent."'

21 °

The Commission argued that the second

sentence must be viewed in the context of the rest
of section 332(c) (3) (A). According to the Commission, the first sentence sets out the basic
framework: a state may not regulate "the entry of
or the rates charged by," but it may regulate
"other terms and conditions" of wireless services.
The Commission then argued that the second
and third sentences embody exceptions to the
first sentence's ban on state regulation. 221 Similar
to the Kansas Commission's conclusion in the
Tenth Circuit appeal, the FCC concluded that the
second sentence allows a state to promote universal service by regulating rates if wireless services
are a substitute for land line telephone exchange
service for a substantial portion of the communications within such state, which the first sentence

would otherwise bar the state from doing. 222

The D.C. Circuit found that the important
point was that the second sentence of section
332(c) (3) (A) did not, by its terms, preempt any216
217

See id.
See Universal Sevice Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 8776, 9181-82

(1997).
219

See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (3) (A) (1994).
Cellular Telecomm. Indus. Ass'n, 168 F.3d at 1335.

220
221
222

See id.
See id.
See id.

223

See id. at 1335-36.
See Cellular Telecomm.

218

224

1335-36.
226

See id.
See id. at 1335.

227

See id. at 1336.

225

Indus. Ass'n, 168

F.3d at

[Vol. 8

thing. 223 The court found that all the preempting

is done in the first sentence; 2 24 while the second
and third sentences contain exceptions. 2 25 Accordingly, the court determined that CTIA's position that the second sentence itself, preempts the
Texas statute could not be correct, because the
second sentence does not preempt and it does
not forbid. 22 6 The court held that CTIA failed to
demonstrate that its interpretation of section
332(c)(3)(A) was the only permissible one, or
that the Texas universal service laws were rate or
entry regulation.2 27 The court noted that, consistent with rules of statutory construction, the Commission's interpretation of section 332(c) (3) (A)
gave meaning to each sentence, which fairly reflects the statute's purpose-to limit state rate and
entry but not universal service regulation-and
further, harmonizes section 332(c) (3) (A) and
section 254(f). 228 Thus, the court found no basis
for setting aside the Commission's Pittencrieffdeci22 9

sion.

The Fifth Circuit has most recently ruled on
section 332, in Texas Office of Public Utilities Counsel
v. FCC.2 30 In this case, which presented another

challenge to state-imposed universal service obligations, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that it was
a "convincing challenge" to the FCC's determination that section 332 was not a bar to state-imposed universal service payments by CMRS carriers. 23 1 The court nevertheless upheld the FCC's

decision to allow states to impose universal service
contribution obligations on CMRS carriers, based
on a step-one Chevron analysis. 23 2 Perhaps hinting
at some discomfort with its Chevron step-one analysis, however, the Fifth Circuit noted that "[e]ven if
the CMRS providers are right that the plain language does not unambiguously support the FCC's
reading, we would defer to the FCC's reasonable
interpretation under Chevron step two." 233 With

this reasoning, the Fifth Circuit essentially
See id. at 1336-37.
See id.
230
183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999).
231
See id. at 430.
232 See id. at 433. See also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The
Court defined the Chevron step one as follows: "First, always,
is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id.
233 Id. at 433 n.66. See also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. The
Chevron Court stated,
If Congress has not directly addressed the precise ques228
229
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adopted the D.C. Circuit's interpretation in Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association v. FCC,
finding that the FCC's reconciliation of sections
254(f) and 332(c) (3) (A) would permit the following understanding of the statute:
States (1) in general can never regulate rates and entry
requirements for CMRS providers; (2) are free to regulate all other terms and conditions of CMRS service; (3)
may regulate CMRS rates and entry requirements when
they have made a substitutability finding in connection
with universal service programs; and (4) may also regulate CMRS rates if they petition the FCC and meet certain statutory requirements, including
either sub234
stitutability or unjust market rates.

The D.C. and Fifth.Circuits' ultimate decisions
are similar to the Tenth Circuit's judgment in the
Mountain Solutions appeal; 2 35 although they rein-

force the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit's decision, they do not add much more to articulating
the parameters of section 332 beyond the universal service debate. The only noticeable difference
between the decisions is that the Tenth and Fifth
Circuits adopted Chevron analyses in their decisions, while the D.C. Circuit focused on the fundamentals of statutory construction. All three
courts, however, came to the same conclusion in
allowing the state universal service programs to
2 36
stand.
While the Tenth, Fifth and D.C. Circuits have
found common ground, there is one state court
that has disagreed and found a state universal service program to be preempted by section 332.
Metro Mobile CTS v. ConnecticutDepartment of Public
Utility Controt2 37 involved a challenge to a Connecticut PUC decision requiring CMRS providers
to contribute to the Connecticut state universal
service fund established pursuant to the universal
service provisions adopted in the Telecommunications Act of

1996.238

Specifically, the court as-

sessed the interplay between the two section
332(c) (3) (A) phrases: (1) "this paragraph shall
not prohibit a state from regulating the other

-

tion at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statue, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on permissible construction of

the statute.
Id.
234 See id.
235

See Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. SCC of Kansas, 149 F.3d

1058 (10th Cir. 1998).
236 See Cellular Telecomm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 168 F.3d

terms and conditions of commercial mobile services[;]" and (2)
Nothing in this subparagraph shall exempt providers of
commercial mobile services (where such services are a
substitute for land line telephone exchange service for
a substantial portion of the communications within
such state) from requirements imposed by a state commission on all providers of telecommunications services
necessary to ensure the universal availability
of telecom2 39
munications service at affordable rates.

Similarly to the D.C. Circuit, the Connecticut
court placed great emphasis on the statutory language and the established principle that "rules of
statutory construction require that no language in
a statute be read to be redundant."240 Using these
tools of judicial analysis, the Connecticut arrived
at the opposite conclusion. The court found the
correct interpretation of the interplay between
the two provisions to be as follows: Because the
preemption clause in the first sentence of section
332(c) (3) (A) grants to the states the authority to
regulate "other terms and conditions" of cellular
service, the subsequent preemption clause in the
second sentence of section 332(c) (3) (A), expressly exempting from preemption any assessments for universal and affordable service where
cellular service is a significant substitute for land
line service, would be redundant if such assessments were among "other terms and conditions"
of cellular service already exempt. 241 Accordingly,

the court decided,
By expressly exempting from preemption those assessments which are made on cellular providers in a state
in which cellular service is a substitute for land line service, Congress left no ambiguity that cellular providers
in states in which cellular is not a substitute for land
line service
fall under the umbrella of federal preemp24 2
tion.

The court found, therefore, that the 1993 Act
amendments prohibited the state commission
from assessing Metro Mobile (a cellular carrier)
for payments to the state Universal Service and
243
Lifeline Programs for interstate services.
at 1336-37 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999); Sprint Spectrum, 149
F.3d at 1062.
237
See Metro Mobile CTS, Inc. v. Conn. Dept. of Pub.
Util. Control, No. CV-95-0051275S (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996).
238
See id. at *1-2.
239
Id. at *2-3.
240
Id. at *3.
241
See id. at *3.
242
See Metro Mobile CTS, Inc. v. Conn. Dept. of Pub.
Util. Control, supra note 237, at *3.
243 See id. at *7.
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V.

SECTION 332 AS A DEVICE TO TRUMP
ZONING LAWS

While the most prevalent uses of section 332
are as a defense against state-based customer complaint claims and as a mechanism to avoid statebased universal service payments, carriers also
have attempted to use the preemption provision
to avoid state zoning laws.
244
In Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina,

Sprint Spectrum alleged that a six-month moratorium on the issue of new special-use permits for
wireless communications facilities, imposed by the
city of Medina, Washington, violated section
332(c) (3) (A), among other laws. 2 4 5 Because of its

location, Medina was a prime area for the placement of wireless telecommunications antennas,
and the city was concerned that it would become
an "antenna farm." 24 6 The city argued that the

moratorium was necessary to allow it time to assess the "flurry of applications" that was expected
in response to the passage of the Telecommunications Act of

1996.247

The measure, which sus-

pended only the issuance of permits and not the
processing of applications, was enacted so that the
city council would have time to study the "requirements of the entire spectrum of wireless providers."

248
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"no state or local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of.

.

. any commer-

cial mobile service or any private mobile service. "249
The court found that moratorium on issuance
of new special use permits for wireless communications facilities did not violate section 332, noting that "[n]othing in the record suggests that
this is other than a necessary and bona fide effort
to act carefully in a field with rapidly evolving
technology. Nothing in the moratorium would
prevent Sprint's application, or anyone else's,
from being granted. ' 250 In response to Sprint's
332 claim, the Court found that Sprint's argument implied that section 332 bars any rejection
by local government of wireless provider's application for zoning variance. The court found this to
be contrary to the intent of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which specifically preserves local zoning authority. 25' Therefore, the Court
found that the City of Medina's moratorium did
not "regulate the entry" of any applicant within
the meaning of section 332, and allowed the city's
25 2
temporary moratorium to stand.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Sprint, who had just won PCS licensing

rights for the geographic area including the Medina, argued that the moratorium threatened it
with irreparable harm and would cause it to lose
large amounts of money, because Sprint would be
delayed in obtaining full coverage of the geographic region. Sprint's section 332 argument was
that the moratorium violated the provision that
244

924 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Wash. 1996).

245
246
247
248

See id. at 1037.

249

Id. at 1040; see also 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (3) (A) (1994).

250
251

Medina, 924 F. Supp. at 1040.

See id.
See id.

Id. at 1038-39.
See id. at 1040.

Other courts have not been as accepting of zoning
moratoria. In Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F.
Supp. 1457 (1997), the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama struck a moratorium enacted by Jefferson
County, Alabama. Jefferson County adopted three moratoria
252

in total, the first of which was very similar to the moratorium
adopted by the City of Medina; it was enacted to give the
county time to establish review procedures for an influx of

rezoning applications that was expected after the passage of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See id. at 1461. Neither
the first nor the second moratoria were never challenged. See

id.at 1461-62. The third moratorium, however, was chal-

In Federalist No. 7,253 Hamilton wrote about
dissension between the states and the contentiousness he feared would ensue if the states did
not join into one union. In addressing what he
called "competitions of commerce," Hamilton
said, "Each state, or separate confederacy, would
pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to
lenged by Sprint and Nextel, who argued that the County did
not comply with procedural requirements in the adoption of
the moratorium, and therefore the enactment was void
under state law. See id. at 1463. The court compared Jefferson
County's moratorium with that in Medina, and found that
"[t]he facts of this case have little in common with Medina."
See id. at 1466. The court compared the third moratorium to
Medina's, and found that the time difference in the enactments was the key factor: Jefferson County's moratorium
came 15 months after the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, while Medina's came only 5 days after the
passage of the 1996 Act. See id. Additionally, Medina's moratorium did not suspend the processing of applications, only
the issuance of permits, while Jefferson County's suspended
the processing of applications and the issuance of permits.
See id.; see also AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of the
City of Virginia Beach, 979 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Va. 1997);
Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of Farmington, 1997 WL
631104 (D. Conn. 1997).
253 The Federalist No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton).
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itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget discon25 4
tent."
2 55
comSuch "peculiarized" and "balkanized"
mercial policies were exactly the target of section
332. In passing revised section 332 in 1993, Congress revamped the mobile wireless regulatory
scheme to provide a national framework within
which wireless services and competition could
flourish. Federal preemption of certain specified
areas was a necessary component of the enactment, so as to free carriers from unneccessary delays from state regulatory authorities and to allow
for more efficient launching of new services.
Congress intended section 332 to preempt state
regulations that had been hurdles in the rapid development of wireless services; it therefore set
forth a regulatory framework that was federalist in
nature, whereby rates and entry were to be in the
jurisdiction of the FCC while all other terms and
conditions of service were the domain of the
states. This framework removed one of the major
obstacles CMRS carriers faced in providing wireless service-gaining state-by-state certificationsallowing service providers to more quickly get into
the market, launch new services, and ultimately,
promote competition.
The FCC's implementation of section 332 has
in many ways given effect to the intent of Congress, but it has misinterpreted or ignored that intent in several proceedings. The Commission's recent Memorandum Opinion and Order addressing
Southwestern Bell's Petitionfor DeclaratoryRuling is
an example of how the FCC is successfully implementing section 332; in that Memorandum Opinion
and Order, the FCC used its preemptive authority
to specifically safeguard carriers from state requirements that were impeding the competitive
abilities of carriers. In other contexts, however,
254
255

Id.

In re Petition of Arizona Corporation Commission to
Extend State Authority Over Rate and Entry Regulation of all
Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd. 7824, 7828, para. 15

such as in regard to universal service, the Commission has ignored the intent of Congress, and
has allowed states to impose obligations on CMRS
carriers that are disallowed by the plain language
of section 332.
While the FCC's implementation of section 332
has, in many ways, established a solid foundation
for the governing of wireless services on a national level, the courts have done little to sharpen
the definition of section 332 because of their reluctance to thoroughly explore section 332's limits. Four circuit courts have reached section 332
issues; the Sixth Circuit circumvented the substantive section 332 issues by basing its findings on
precedent unrelated to section 332. The Tenth,
Fifth and D.C. Circuits have contributed more to
the defining of section 332, but their decisions are
somewhat limited in scope, as they deal specifically with state-imposed universal service obligations.
Carriers, therefore, are left with little guidance
concerning the scope of section 332 beyond the
universal service debate; clearly, these carriers will
continue to challenge state enactments the carriers perceive as preempted by section 332. Presumably, courts will eventually be forced to specifically
enumerate the protections provided in section
332 for carriers involved in billing and other disputes at the state level. Carriers will, of course,
push for a uniform, federal policy governing
CMRS services, as such a policy is consistent with
the interstate service that so many CMRS providers provide. A uniform national policy will allow
carriers to devote their resources to new services
and will lead to greater competition. Consumers
will be the ultimate beneficiaries of a "federalist"
policy, not one that is "balkanized state by
state." 256

(1995) (stating, "As the legislative history of [the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act] makes plain, Congress intended
those building blocks to establish a national regulatory policy
for CMRS, not a policy that is balkanized state-by-state").
256
Id.

